Houston (1997) has made a valuable point by clarifying a confusion between 'slope' and 'elasticity' of demand curves that I made in a preliminary attempt to bring together animal suffering, fitness and the economics of choice (1990) . He also reminds us that animals in captivity may continue to use rules that are appropriate to their natural habitats rather than their present environments. While agreeing with both these points, I am concerned that he has suggested a measure of welfare that in its own way could be even more problematical, without apparently realizing the difficulties it raises. I am also concerned that his paper could be taken as a blanket criticism of the whole approach of using demand curves in animal welfare, for example, through his statement 'Economists did not introduce elasticity to look at issues of human welfare, so it will not be surprising to them that elasticity does not necessarily provide a general measure of animal welfare'. In fact, he is simply, and correctly, pointing out that some of the theoretical and methodological issues it raises have not yet been completely dealt with. Furthermore, it is important to make it clear that his paper does not constitute a refutation of the important idea that suffering is a Darwinian adaptation directly related to fitness which the unwary reader might think it was intended to be when reading sentences such as: 'I have emphasized that the slope of a demand curve and its elasticity are distinct measures, and that neither may be correlated with lost fitness in the way suggested by Dawkins (1990) '. Even this conclusion is based on his use of one particular model which, as I would like to point out, may not be the most appropriate one to use with real animals and their potential suffering.
(1) Houston quotes my (1990) definition of suffering: 'Suffering occurs when unpleasant subjective feelings are acute or continue for a long time because the animal is unable to carry out the actions that would normally reduce risks to life and reproduction in those circumstances'. The first part of this sentence, along with a much fuller explanation in the same article make it quite clear that I meant much more by 'suffering' than just whether one behaviour had a flatter demand curve than another. Suffering has to be extreme, that is, acute or prolonged as I state explicitly (page 2): 'A mild itch may be unpleasant but it can hardly be said to cause suffering; itching so severe that it prevents someone from sleeping or working amounts to suffering'. Suffering is not, as Houston seems to imply, something that occurs whenever an animal is slightly more motivated to do one thing than another. Suffering occurs when an animal is so highly motivated to gain something (e.g. a nest) or to get away from something (e.g. a predator) but unable to do so that it will literally 'do anything' to get what it wants. Thus an animal that is suffering from fear or suffering from being confined in a small cage would be an animal that put escape at the top of its motivational priorities to such an extent that it would choose to escape even if it meant forgoing food, a mate or anything else. An important way of demonstrating this is to show that the animal will work harder to escape than it will work to do other activities. The capacity to prioritize behaviour in this extreme way when there is a major perceived risk to fitness is not arbitrary. Animals that are able to 'do anything' to remove themselves from such major threats would survive and reproduce better than those that do not. In this sense, 'suffering' is adaptive.
Houston, however, does not deal with this acute 'highest priority' aspect of suffering and goes on
